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HUME’S THEORY OF 
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THAN ONE?
Abstract: It is traditionally assumed 
that there is only one theory of causa-
lity in Hume’s writings. In this article 
it is shown that we can distinguish 
between an early and mature theory. 
It is argued that the mature theory, 
strongly infl uenced by Newton’s 
physics, accords with the New Hume 
(sceptical realist) interpretation by 
asserting that real causal relations 
are not accessible to the human 
mind.
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James Hill
Th ere can be little doubt that the centre piece of Hume’s epistemological 
and ontological writings is his treatment of causation. It is the theme that 
provides a  foundation for many of his other original theses – his doubts 
about the rational basis of inductive proof, his reconciliation of determinism 
and freedom, his critique of testimony about miracles, and his arguments 
against proofs of God’s existence. Causation is also the theme that has most 
resonated in the reception of Hume. Most famously, it was Hume’s scepti-
cism about causation that aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumbers and 
spurred him to develop his critical philosophy – at least if Kant himself in 
his Prolegomena is to be believed. Hume’s theory of causation has been more 
positively infl uential in later English-speaking philosophy, and attachment 
to the spirit of his theory – if not to its letter – is currently so widespread as 
to be perhaps the default position.
Hume’s treatment of causation is of particular importance because he is 
convinced that the causal nexus is the basis for all our factual beliefs that go 
beyond the immediate deliverances of perception or memory. Hume argues 
that anything we know about the surrounding world which is not directly 
perceived or recalled, is known by causal inference. If I believe that a friend 
of mine is now in France I will base my belief on causal reasoning – I have 
a letter from him (eff ect), or I know his previous resolution (cause). If I hear 
an articulate voice from the next room I  infer the presence of a  person 
(cause). If I see a fi re, I may infer its heat (eff ect) As Hume concludes, “If we 
anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall fi nd that they are 
founded on the relation of cause and eff ect”.1 Our belief systems are satu-
rated with causal inference and we would be prisoners of our own minds if 
we doubted all causal relations.
Hume goes on to show that our concept of cause is actually much less 
straightforward than we might at fi rst think. We mistakenly assume, he 
argues, that we can directly perceive causal connections in nature, when in 
fact we are only acquainted with regular successions of events, or what he 
calls their “constant conjunctions”. We perceive one kind of event followed 
by another on many diff erent occasions, and gradually become acquainted
1  David HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), revised by P. H. Nidditch, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978, 26–27.
I am grateful to the anonymous referees of this journal for many helpful comments. Th is paper 
was written as a part of the grant project “Formal and Historical Approaches to Epistemology,” 
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with the regularities of nature. Th e impact of one billiard ball is followed by 
movement in the billiard ball that it strikes. Th is is observed to happen on 
diff erent, but resembling occasions. Indeed it is characteristic of all such col-
lisions between hard bodies. Th is law-like regularity then leads us to assume 
what we call a “causal” connection. Our conviction that there is a causal – or 
necessary – connection between the impact of the fi rst billiard ball and the 
movement of the second is, in fact, traceable to our own subjective reaction 
to the regularity. We come to anticipate what will happen when the fi rst ball 
strikes the second. On seeing the impact – or imminent impact – of the fi rst 
billiard ball, we automatically expect the second ball to move off  in a straight 
line. When this movement in the second ball does indeed happen we feel 
that it simply had to happen because it confi rms our expectation. We thus 
invest the regularities of nature with our own subjective feeling of necessity.
Th e account of causation which I  have just sketched, involves two 
components: regularity and subjective necessity, and these are refl ected in 
Hume’s two defi nitions of causation according to which a cause is, on the one 
hand, that which immediately precedes, and is constantly conjoined with, its 
eff ect; and, on the other hand, that which leads the imagination to anticipate 
the eff ect.2 Th is dual characterisation of causation conspicuously avoids as-
serting an actual necessary connection between events. Th is can leave the 
reader feeling disenchanted or even robbed. Th e world has been reduced to 
a series of regular, law-like events, the necessity of which is a projection of 
our own psychology. Many treat this as not really a theory of causation at all, 
but a denial that causation exists.
In the last few decades of Hume scholarship a  new interpretation of 
his view of causation has been proposed by, among others, John P. Wright, 
Donald Livingston and Galen Strawson, which has been dubbed “the New 
Hume”.3 Th is supplements the traditional account of Hume’s theory that 
2  Th e two defi nitions are presented at HUME, Treatise, 169–172 and HUME, Enquiries, 
76–77.
3  See J. P. WRIGHT, Th e Sceptical Realism of David Hume. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press 1983; D. W. LIVINGSTON, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1984; Galen STRAWSON, Th e Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism and David 
Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989. Strawson and Wright have further papers defending 
the sceptical realist interpretation in Rupert READ – Kenneth RICHMAN (eds.), Th e New 
Hume Debate. London: Routledge 2007. Most recently, Strawson provides a  robust defence 
of the interpretation in Galen STRAWSON, Th e Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal 
Identity. Oxford: OUP 2011, see esp. p.  1–32. Kenneth WINKLER fi rst called the sceptical 
realist interpretation “Th e New Hume”, which is also the title of his classic critique of the 
interpretation published in Philosophical Review, vol. 100, 1991, no. 4, p. 541–579. Winkler’s 
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I have just sketched so as to alleviate the feeling that Hume is denying cau-
sality. Th ey argue that Hume is not seeking to rob nature of real necessary 
connections. In fact he is happy to assume, with the rest of us, that real causal 
powers do indeed exist. Hume’s point is to question our epistemic access to 
the nature of these powers. On this view of Hume, the world contains causal 
powers that elude our best attempts to uncover them. Th is interpretation 
claims that Hume is a “sceptical realist”4 about causation – realist because he 
never doubts the metaphysical reality of necessary connections, but scepti-
cal because human minds are quite in the dark about what kind of necessary 
connections ground the regularity of phenomena.
 With the emergence of the New Hume interpretation, commentators 
have tended to take sides, joining one of two opposing camps. On one side 
we have the Old Humeans, who defend the view that Hume is denying 
necessary connections in nature. Th ese traditionalists argue that Th e New 
Hume is not really Hume because it ignores his empiricist strictures about 
meaning. All ideas are derived from impressions, and the lack of an impres-
sion of a necessary causal connection means that we have no meaningful 
idea of it that we might attach to the term “causation”. On the other side are 
the New Humeans who argue that the traditional view is actually a product 
of twentieth-century positivism that anachronistically attributes to Hume 
a  restrictive semantic theory. Hume is not Carnap. His texts clearly show 
that he worked with an intuitive understanding of causation, despite his 
holding that we are not acquainted with a single instance of such a causal 
connection. At no point, they argue, does Hume deny that this intuitive 
conception of causal power is applicable to nature. Indeed this is what makes 
him a sceptic, rather than a negative dogmatist. He confesses his ignorance 
of the nature of real causal connexion, but does not deny that it exists.
Not all commentators have taken sides in this debate. Helen Beebee,5 for 
example, has off ered an interpretation of Hume on causation that fails to fi t 
either interpretation. But the debate remains the central to contemporary 
discussion of Hume. In this paper I  wish to argue that the two opposing 
parties actually share an important, and highly questionable, assumption. 
It is this that makes the confl ict between them so intractable. I believe that 
when the assumption is brought into the open we can see that there is truth 
paper is reprinted with a  postscript in READ – RICHMAN (eds.), Th e New Hume Debate, 
p. 52–87.
4  See the title of J. P. Wright’s book in note 3.
5  Helen BEEBEE, “Th e Two Defi nitions and the Doctrine of Necessity.” In: Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, vol. 107, 2007, p. 413–431.
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contained in both interpretations of Hume’s views on causation, and we can 
begin to fi nd our way to a solution to the debate.
1. One theory or two?
Th e common assumption, made by practically all the contributors to the 
New Hume debate, is that there is only one theory of causation in Hume. It 
is assumed that in the three main discussions of causation that Hume gave 
us – in his Treatise on Human Nature, in his Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding and in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion – there is 
a  single, unchanging, position being put forward. Strangely this assump-
tion has been untouched by the widespread awareness that the New Hume 
interpretation fi nds more evident support in the Enquiry published in 1748, 
than it does in the fi rst book of the Treatise, which was published nine years 
earlier in 1739.
 I wish to make a simple suggestion: that we treat these diff erences of 
emphasis as pointing towards a deeper shift  in Hume’s theory. I would even 
go as far as to say that Hume has two theories of causation, one replacing the 
other. Of course there are important continuities between the two theories: 
they share core features and are recognisably by the same author. But Hume 
not only changes the details of his theory in the Enquiry, he also introduces 
a  new understanding of its ontological status. Th e Dialogues, published 
posthumously, but largely written in the early 1750’s, a  few years aft er the 
Enquiry, confi rm Hume’s attachment to the new theory. Th ere is an early 
Hume and a mature Hume on causation.
I should emphasise that I am not only concerned to make the descrip-
tive, historical point that Hume’s thought on causation developed in time. 
Rather, I  wish to explore the philosophical question of how and why this 
development took place. We shall see that it is Hume’s attitude to the me-
chanical philosophy and the emerging Newtonian understanding of nature, 
in which active forces play a fundamental role that drives the development of 
his thinking about causality. We shall also discover that the position Hume 
gradually arrives at is more subtle, and philosophically more satisfactory, 
than the original position put forward in his Treatise – a book which still 
receives disproportionate attention in spite of the author’s later verdict that 
it is a ‘juvenile work’.6
6  See his “Advertisement” to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (E 2).
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2. Why must Hume be static?
Th e idea that there is only one, unchanging, Hume has been a  traditional 
mainstay of the secondary literature. It is bound up with the equally deep-
rooted assumption that the Treatise contains the most complete account of 
his philosophical position, and that the Enquiry is a popular – and somewhat 
dumbed down – summary of that same position. It is common to fi nd com-
mentators framing an interpretation of a passage in the Enquiry by draw-
ing on arguments that are not found in the Enquiry at all, but which were 
presented in the Treatise. It is also common to fi nd the diff erences between 
the Treatise and Enquiry being treated not as evidence of a change of mind 
so much as a  change in presentation. When topics are dropped from the 
Enquiry (for example, the theory of space and time, or the theory of personal 
identity), commentators oft en assume that Hume would still stand by the 
positions he advanced in the Treatise, but that he thought their complexities 
would not be appropriate in the more popular work.
If the contributors to the New Hume debate generally assume a static 
Hume, we seldom see this assumption being explicitly argued for. So Galen 
Strawson should be commended for actually recognising it and defending it 
as follows:
It cannot be plausibly argued that there is early Hume and late Hume, that they 
are importantly diff erent, and that each deserves study in his own right. Hume 
was at work on the Treatise-clarifying Enquiry within fi ve years of the publica-
tion of the Treatise and probably earlier, and (once again) was most insistent 
that the philosophical principles are the same in both. We have no reason to 
judge him to be self-deceived on this matter.7
Strawson off ers two arguments against a developmental account here. Th e 
fi rst is that there was not enough time between the Treatise and Enquiry for 
a signifi cant shift  of viewpoint; and secondly, that Hume himself ‘insisted’ 
that his philosophical principles had not altered. On the question of time 
one notices that in comparing the date of publication of the Treatise with 
the date of composition of the Enquiry Strawson is not actually compar-
ing like with like. Hume tells John Stewart, in a letter of 1754,8 that he had 
fi nished composing the Treatise by the time he was 25, three years before it 
7  Galen STRAWSON, “David Hume: Objects and Power.” In: READ, R. – RICHMAN, K. 
(eds.), Th e New Hume Debate, p. 33 (31–51).
8  GREIG, J. Y. T (ed.) Th e Letters of David Hume. Vol. 1. New York and London: Garland 
Publishing 1983, p. 187.
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was published, so Strawson’s estimate of a fi ve year gap is probably several 
years too short. But even if there were only fi ve years between Hume com-
posing the Treatise and the Enquiry one might still ask why this is too short 
a time for signifi cant development to take place in his account of causation. 
Isn’t fi ve weeks long enough for a philosopher to have a change of mind on 
a signifi cant question?
Th e support for Strawson’s second claim that Hume himself was “most 
insistent” that his philosophical principles are the same in the Enquiry as in 
the Treatise is less easy to gauge because no reference is provided. One can 
certainly fi nd Hume insisting that the changes between the two books are 
more a matter of presentation than of principles. But it is hard to put one’s 
fi nger on an actual denial that there is any change of principles. For example, 
in the “Advertisement” to the Enquiry Hume implies that at least some of his 
principles in the later book are new, though he allows that “most of the prin-
ciples, and reasonings” were contained in the Treatise. He also states that 
“some negligences in his former reasoning” have been corrected, which also 
suggests change in content, not just wording. Most importantly, the author 
tells us he would like the Enquiry “alone [to] be regarded as containing his 
philosophical sentiments and principles”9. In other words, Hume is urging 
us to read the Enquiry in isolation from the earlier work.
In the last ten years there has been a greater tendency to read the Enquiry 
as a  separate, self-standing, philosophical work. Stephen Buckle’s Hume’s 
Enlightenment Tract (2001)10 and the collection of essays edited by Peter Mil-
lican, Reading Hume on Human Understanding (2002)11 are fi ne examples 
of this tendency. Th ese books, however, though they treat the Enquiry as 
relatively self-contained, do little to separate his account of causation there 
from what he says on the subject in the Treatise. It is my aim to do precisely 
that.
3. Causation and contact
In comparisons of the accounts of causation in the Treatise and Enquiry there 
is one diff erence that has oft en been noted, but which is usually given little 
more than passing attention. In the Treatise Hume claims that a cause must, 
9  “Advertisement” (my emphasis), HUME, Enquiries, 2.
10  Stephen BUCKLE, Hume’s Enlightenment Tract: Th e Unity and Purpose of an Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001.
11  Peter MILLICAN (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First 
Enquiry. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002.
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by defi nition, be spatially contiguous with its eff ect, while in the Enquiry this 
condition is dropped and only temporal precedence is treated as necessary. 
In other words, the Treatise states that a cause and eff ect must be in a state of 
mutual contact, while in the Enquiry contact is no longer thought necessary 
to the causal relation and, indeed, Hume draws attention to causal powers, 
such as magnetic attraction and gravitational pull, in which perceivable 
contact does not in fact occur.12
To treat this change as negligible, and easily passed over, is an odd 
policy. Spatial contiguity was a defi ning feature of causation in the Treatise
that Hume put considerable emphasis on. Hume points to spatial contiguity 
in the fi rst characterisation of causation that he off ers,13 and it then explicitly 
enters into his defi nitions of the causal relation,14 and it is also contained in 
the fi rst of his eight “general rules” which are to determine our knowledge of 
real causal relations.15 In the Enquiry all such references to spatial contigu-
ity are carefully and systematically avoided. Th e diff erence between the two 
texts on this issue is clearcut.
Now, by dropping the condition of spatial contiguity Hume changes his 
positive theory of causation. Th e vital term “constant conjunction” acquires 
a broader meaning in the second work. In the Treatise two objects are con-
joined when they are not just temporal neighbours, but also spatial neigh-
bours, on many repeated occasions. In the Enquiry temporal precedence is 
now enough, making constant conjunction quite compatible with action at 
a distance. Th is means not only that the intension of the term “constant con-
junction” is diff erent, but also that its extension – the class of event-pairings 
that it picks out – has become considerably wider.
What led Hume to make this change? One possibility is that he was 
reacting to a diffi  culty with mental causation. In the Treatise he admits that 
a place can hardly be ascribed to minds or their contents, and therefore they 
are not susceptible of the relation of spatial contiguity.16 Th us commentators 
have sometimes claimed that Hume drops the condition of spatial contigu-
ity to accommodate “body-mind” and “mind-mind” causal relations. Th is 
may, indeed, be part of the truth, but it cannot be the whole story. Something 
was infl uencing him, in the Treatise, to assert spatial contiguity despite the 
12  Magnetism (“the attraction of a  lodestone”) and gravitation (the falling of a  stone) are 
specifi cally mentioned at E. 28 and 29 respectively.
13  HUME, Treatise, 75.
14  Ibid., 170.
15  Ibid., 173–174.
16  See Treatise, Part IV, section V (HUME, Treatise, 232–251).
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problem with mental causation. And that “something” seems to be no longer 
infl uential on the Hume of the Enquiry. I wish to argue that a change in his 
understanding of natural philosophy is what is really behind the change. 
As Annette Baier has recently suggested, Hume sought to accommodate 
gravitational attraction in the Enquiry.17
It is well known that in the fi rst half of the eighteenth century there 
was a lively controversy about the role of contact in material causation. Th e 
mechanical paradigm had asserted that matter can operate only by impulse, 
meaning that there must be pushing, collision, shock, percussion, or by 
some other interaction involving contact and motion. “Th e communication 
of motion by impulse”, to use Hume’s favoured phrase, was thought to be 
the only way in which material nature operates. Mechanism thus asserted 
a form of causal monism: there was only contact action. Th is monism was 
common to corpuscularians in both the English Boylean tradition, and in 
the French Cartesian tradition. It was strenuously asserted by Leibniz in his 
correspondence with Clarke, and it was also defended by Huyghens and by 
Jakub Bernouilli. It was accepted as obvious by Malebranche, whose work 
Hume was immersed in when composing the Treatise.18 Although these 
thinkers would have exempted the mind from their mechanistic world view, 
they held that, as far as the material world was concerned, there was a single 
kind of contact-based interaction. A body had no active power that might be 
the origin of motion in itself or another body. Rather it could only pass on 
motion that it received from another body. Matter was thus inert or “dead”.
But, during the period that Hume was writing, cracks were appearing 
in the mechanical consensus as the work of Isaac Newton and his followers 
exerted increasing pressure upon it. Newton put forward active forces, such 
as gravitational attraction, which resisted any reduction to mechanical im-
pulse. Th ese forces or powers went beyond the mere transfer of motion from 
one piece of inert matter to another by impulse. Th ey were oft en character-
ised as “spontaneous” powers because they enabled a body to produce mo-
tion in another body without passing on its own motion and thus divesting 
itself of the power. Newton’s active powers meant that the essence of matter 
could no longer be reduced to the mechanical aff ections of size, shape, im-
penetrability and mobility. Instead matter contained a hitherto unknown – 
17  See particularly Annette BAIER, “Th e Energy in the Cause.” In: Death and Character: 
Further Refl ections on Hume, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2008, p. 224–236.
18  See Nicolas MALEBRANCHE, Th e Search aft er Truth. Lennon, T. M. – Olscamp, P. J. (eds.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, p.  500 (“impulsion” in this passage involves 
contact action).
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and perhaps unknowable – nature that grounded these active powers. Most 
shocking for the mechanical consensus, however, was that Newton’s active 
powers – particularly gravitational force, but also the repulsive and associa-
tive forces between particles that he speculated over in his Opticks – seemed 
to involve action at a distance. It was no longer obvious that the condition of 
contact between cause and eff ect was a self-evident axiom.
In the Fourth Section of the Enquiry, Hume makes clear here that he 
endorses the Newtonian break with the mechanical philosophy. Th is section 
is one of a few extended passages that has no counterpart in the Treatise. In it 
Hume takes a transparent case of mechanical causation, the collision of bil-
liard balls, and argues that there is nothing that makes this causal connexion 
more intrinsically intelligible than the cases of causal interaction which the 
mechanist disparaged as opaque – and thus in need of a micro-mechanical 
explanation – such as the adhesion of two pieces of smooth marble, the 
explosion of gunpowder, magnetic attraction, and the power of gravitation. 
Th e mechanical philosophy, Hume implies, is based on a false hierarchy of 
transparency. In fact there are only more or less customary causal relations, 
and the mechanical ones beguile us, by their very familiarity, into imagining 
that they reveal the real nature of causal interaction. Th is leads Hume to 
explicitly reject the causal monism of the mechanical philosophy:
Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; 
these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever dis-
cover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves suffi  ciently happy, if, by accurate 
enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near 
to, these general principles.19
Here the openly non-mechanical principles of elasticity, gravity and co-
hesion are placed alongside impulse as equally fundamental to natural 
science. To attempt to reduce all causation to mechanical interaction, is to 
ignore the fact that the communication of motion between colliding billi-
ard balls is no more necessary and transparent than the other three causal 
powers on the list: Hume reminds us that a collision can, in principle, lead 
to any number of diff erent motions in the two balls, and we only know by 
experience what the outcome will be. All causal powers, whether mecha-
nical or active, are known through mere regularity that is discovered by 
repeated experience.
19  HUME, Enquiries, 30–31.
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In the same passage, Hume then embraces two other features of the 
Newtonian view. He argues that the pluralism of causal principles must be 
disciplined by a principle of parsimony. We cannot multiply the basic causal 
principles in natural science indefi nitely. Rather, as Roger Cotes wrote in his 
Preface to the second edition of Newton’s Principia, “the causes of all things 
are to be derived from the simplest possible principles”.20 In a similar spirit, 
Hume writes that we must aim 
to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a  greater sim-
plicity, and to resolve the many particular eff ects into a few general causes, by 
means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation.21
Th is is, no doubt, why his causal pluralism is extended to only four funda-
mental principles.
More importantly for us, Hume then goes on to assert that we should 
openly admit our ignorance about the real nature of the causal powers in 
question. Newton famously held that his experimental philosophy only dealt 
with law-like relations between phenomena. He off ered no hypothesis about 
the modus operandi of the forces at work. He did not, like the Scholastics, in-
dulge in pseudo-explanations drawing on occult qualities. Newton remained 
agnostic about the real nature of the powers whose eff ects he described with 
such mathematical precision. We know that mutual gravitational attraction 
diminishes in inverse proportion to the square of the distance between bod-
ies, but we have no idea what that attractive force actually consists in. Hume 
expresses the same kind of scepticism about what lies behind the regularities 
of nature:
[Th e] ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity 
and enquiry. [...] Th e most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off  
our ignorance a little longer. [...] Th us the observation of human blindness and 
weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of 
our endeavours to elude or avoid it.22
20  Roger COTES, “Editor’s Preface to the Second Edition.” In: Isaac NEWTON, Th e Principia. 
Cohen, I. B. – Whitman, A. (eds.). Berkeley – Los Angeles: University of California Press 1999, 
p. 386 (385–399).
21  HUME, Enquiries, 30.
22  Ibid., 30–31.
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Hume tells us, in the Seventh section of the Enquiry, in a passage that once 
again has no counterpart in the Treatise, that there is an active power of 
gravity in nature as well as the inert power, or vis inertiae. We can trace the 
eff ects of these powers – i.e. the motions of bodies – but we do not compre-
hend the actual forces themselves, whether inert or active.
Th is agnostic conclusion about the inner nature of power is the real 
philosophical import of Newton’s achievement for Hume. In his eulogy to 
Newton, in the History of England we are told that:
While Newton seemed to draw off  the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, 
he shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; 
and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever 
did and ever will remain.23
4. Th e Treatise
So Hume has arrived at a sceptical, Newtonian, view of causal powers in the 
Enquiry. Real powers exist in nature, but their character is inaccessible. But 
what about the Treatise? Was not Hume aware of the Newtonian natural 
philosophy when writing this earlier work?
Th e answer, of course, is yes. But there is no evidence that his thinking 
about causality was in any deep way infl uenced by Newtonianism. It should 
not be forgotten that there was a fairly widespread view, particularly popular 
in France where Hume composed the Treatise between 1734 and 1737, that 
Newton’s force-based natural philosophy would ultimately be amenable to 
a mechanical reduction. Eric Schliesser has recently reminded us that in the 
late 1730’s, on the other side of the channel from Britain, Hume would have 
met with the view – put forward by such authors as Leibniz, Huyghens and 
Rohault – that the inverse-square law could be incorporated into mechani-
cal systems.24 French philosophers were wont to ignore Newton’s talk of 
force and action at a distance, and to continue in their attachment to the 
paradigm of contact action. Bernard Fontenelle, who knew and respected 
Newton’s physics, was still off ering a mechanical view of the universe in his 
23  David HUME, A History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to Th e Revolution in 
1688. Vol. 6. Holthoon, F. van (ed.), Charlottesville: InteLex Corporation 2000 (pagination as 
in 1778 edition), p. 542.
24  Eric SCHLIESSER, “Hume’s Attack on Newton’s Philosophy.” In: Enlightenment and 
Dissent, vol. 25, 2009, p. 173 (167–203).
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Th éorie des tourbillons cartésiens of 1752, published some 13 years aft er the 
Treatise.25
Th ere are indications in the Treatise that Hume himself still had a re-
sidual attachment to the paradigm of the mechanical philosophy which he 
had imbibed, perhaps not always consciously, from the Recherche of Nicolas 
Malebranche.26 Th e most obvious sign of this is the explicit condition of spa-
tial contiguity that we have already mentioned, which is given unqualifi ed 
expression not only in the Treatise, as I have shown, but also in the Abstract, 
where Hume writes that “Contiguity in time and place is [...] a requisite cir-
cumstance to the operation of all causes”, and where he emphasises, with 
reference to the collision of billiard balls, that “the two balls touched one 
another before the motion was communicated”.27
We should also notice that the one clear reference to Newton’s physics 
in the Treatise, the famous comparison Hume makes between the associa-
tion of ideas and gravitational attraction, is undermined by later comments 
in the same work.28 As J. P. Wright has shown, Hume was in fact happy to 
assume an underlying mechanical account of association, adopted from 
Malebranche, in which the fl ow of the animal spirits in the brain creates 
furrows or traces along which the spirits will then be inclined to fl ow again. 
Indeed, he uses this account to explain certain anomalies in association.29 
Hume writes that “these spirits always excite the idea, when they run pre-
cisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell which belongs to the 
idea”, but that sometimes they spill over into adjacent traces, thus rummag-
ing neighbouring cells.30 Th is mechanical framework for understanding the 
25  Bernard FONTENELLE, Th éorie des tourbillons cartésiens avec des réfl exions sur l’attraction. 
Paris 1752.
26  Th e infl uence of Malebranche on Hume’s account of causation has been demonstrated in 
detail over the years. See, for example, C. W. DOXEE, “Hume’s relation to Malebranche.” 
In: Philosophical Review, vol. 25, 1916, no. 5, p.  692–710; R. W. CHURCH, “Malebranche 
and Hume.” Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. 1, 1938, no. 1, p.  143–161; and most 
importantly Charles McCRACKEN, Malebranche and British Philosophy. Clarendon: Oxford 
1983, p. 254–290. McCracken fi nds instances of Hume’s reliance on Malebranche that come 
close to plagiarism. It is noteworthy that Hume instructs his friend Michael Ramsay to 
prepare himself for the argument of the Treatise by reading four books, the fi rst of which is 
“La Recherche de la Verité of Pere Malebranche” (see McCRACKEN, Malebranche, p. 254).
27  HUME, Treatise, 649.
28  “Here is a  kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as 
extraordinary eff ects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms.” 
Ibid., p. 12–13.
29  See WRIGHT, Th e Sceptical Realism, e.g. p. 15–16.
30  HUME, Treatise, 61.
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operations of the imagination in the Treatise has been altogether abandoned 
in the Enquiry. Again, in the Treatise Hume talks of impressions “striking” 
on the mind, or ‘striking’ on the senses, or on the eye.31 Th is conjures up 
a  Hobbesian, mechanical picture of sensation, in which impressions are 
caused by matter in motion. Or, as John Wright has argued, impressions 
themselves may even include motion.32 Th is mechanical language has been 
systematically excluded from the corresponding passages in the Enquiry. It 
would surely be far-fetched to treat this as accidental.
Now, I  would not go as far as to say that Hume was a  mechanist in 
the Treatise. His opposition to the primary-secondary quality distinction 
certainly seems to stand in the way of such an assertion.33 It is also a  fact 
that not all forms of contact action are mechanical – think, say, of a fl ame 
licking a pot and turning it black. So the condition of spatial contiguity is 
not tantamount to the assertion of mechanical causal monism. But I do wish 
to say that Hume’s thinking about causation has not yet taken on board the 
active powers of Newtonianism. For Malebranche, matter was quite inert 
and the only source of causal power was the infi nite will of God. Hume, 
I  suggest, preserves Malebranche’s basic model, treating bodies as utterly 
bereft  of active causal power. He ascribes the seeming necessity of causal 
power not to God, but to the customary transition of our imaginations. He 
treats necessity as a determination of our minds, rather than a determina-
tion of His will.
Th e effi  cacy or energy of causes is neither placed in the causes themselves, nor in 
the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to 
the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances. 
‘Tis here that the real power of causes is plac’d, along with their connexion and 
necessity.34
31  Such descriptions are to be found at HUME, Treatise, 1, 2, 3, and 8. In the Enquiry “force 
and vivacity” qualify impressions themselves, rather than the way they “strike” the mind, or 
senses. It is no doubt for this reason that Hume states in the Enquiry, but not in the Treatise, 
that he is employing the term impression “in a  sense somewhat diff erent from the usual”. 
“Impression”, aft er all, originally refers to the mark left  by a forceful, physical pressure.
32  John P. WRIGHT, Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature: An Introduction. Cambridge: CUP 
2009, p. 62. 
33  See HUME, Treatise, 225–231. Actually, I tend to think that attachment to the mechanical 
paradigm for causation does not necessarily mean attachment to the ontological split between 
primary and secondary qualities. Mechanism can be interpreted as a view not about which 
qualities exist in objects, but about which qualities in bodies are causally active. 
34  HUME, Treatise, 166.
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To put it crudely, the Treatise off ers us occasionalism without God. 
Instead of casting his eyes upwards, like Malebranche, Hume looks inwards. 
Th e source for our belief in a necessary connection is the subjective compul-
sion of our imagination, anticipating the unchanging regularities of nature. 
Th e mind then “spreads itself on external objects”,35 lending to constant 
conjunctions the aura of necessity.
Th e interpretation of the Enquiry I have already advanced sees an im-
portant addition to this story. Hume supplements the regularity of causa-
tion, and the subjective feeling of necessity, with the action of real, albeit 
unknown, powers in nature. Th e theory of the Enquiry does, of course, share 
many signifi cant features with the one put forward in the Treatise. It remains 
true that the sensible qualities of body reveal no causal powers, and that our 
idea of necessary connection is derived from our own imaginations. But now 
there is a  new ontological dimension. Th ere are hidden, non-mechanical, 
connections that underlie the active powers in nature. We are privy only to 
the regular eff ects of these powers, and their real nature lies beyond our ken. 
In the Enquiry causal realism and scepticism are born.
5. An Analogy in the Dialogues
Th e new account of causation in the Enquiry does create a tension in Hume’s 
overall empiricist standpoint. As the Old Humeans have rightly pointed out, 
the postulation of secret connexions does not harmonise well with the “copy 
principle”, according to which all ideas are derived from impressions. Th e 
causal realism of the Enquiry must grant us some idea of necessary connec-
tion in nature, when we posit unknown causes underlying the regularity of 
events. Yet how can we come by such an idea when our impressions lack any 
discernible necessary connection between them? Hume may have escaped 
from the mechanical paradigm, and enriched his view of nature, by grant-
ing it real causal depth, but his new theory seems to off end against his own 
account of the intentionality of thought.
In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion we fi nd this tension has 
been relieved. Some relief is, of course, provided by the very fact that Hume’s 
theory of causation is put forward here without any reference to the “copy 
principle” of the Treatise and Enquiry.36 Hume is certainly still an empiricist 
35  Ibid., 167.
36  David HUME, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Coleman, D. (ed.). Cambridge: CUP 
2007, Part 2, p. 17–28.
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in the Dialogues – empiricism conspires to defeat Demea’s a priori argument 
for God’s existence – but he does not display an attachment to the radical 
concept-empiricism of the early works, or the strictures about meaning as-
sociated with it.
Now, it will almost certainly be objected that there are other reasons 
why the copy principle does not appear in the Dialogues. In particular it 
is not a technical work on the human understanding, like the Treatise and 
the Enquiry. So let us turn to a specifi c passage in the Dialogues that off ers 
us a constructive way of making sceptical realism compatible with Hume’s 
radical empiricism. Th e passage in question is uttered by Philo, whom in-
terpreters generally regard as the interlocutor most faithfully representing 
the author. Philo has already off ered us a  startling variety of hypotheses 
about the underlying nature of the active powers of nature – suggesting, 
for example, that they may be vegetative powers, or powers of an animating 
world soul – thus showing up the narrow assumptions of Cleanthes’ design 
argument which treats the world as a  “machine”. Philo comes to express 
a Newtonian agnosticism about the real nature of necessary causal connec-
tions in the universe, which is quite in keeping with the sceptical realism of 
the New Hume. Th e deep necessities of nature are inaccessible to the human 
mind, though their presence is not to be doubted:
Were the inmost essence of things laid open to us, we should then discover 
a scene, of which, at present, we can have no idea. Instead of admiring the order 
of natural beings, we should clearly see that it was absolutely impossible from 
them, in the smallest article, ever to admit of any other disposition.37
Philo argues for this theme most systematically in Part 9 where he off ers us 
the crucial analogy:
It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9 compose always either 
9 or some lesser product of 9; if you add together all the characters, of which 
any of the former products is composed. Th us, of 18, 27, 36, which are products 
of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. To a superfi cial observer, so 
wonderful a regularity may be admired as the eff ect either of chance or design; 
but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and 
demonstrates, that it must forever result from the nature of these numbers. Is 
it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by 
37  Ibid., p. 50.
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a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key, which solves the 
diffi  culty?38
It must be remembered that Hume never, in any of his works, denies our 
knowledge of necessary mathematical truths. Mathematical examples are 
provided, in the Enquiry, for the relations of ideas which are “intuitively or 
demonstratively certain”.39 We are now invited to use the example of math-
ematical demonstration in helping us comprehend the secret necessities of 
nature. Philo asks us to compare the relation between the superfi cial regu-
larities of the economy of nature and the deep underlying causal necessities, 
with the relation between the superfi cial regularities in the digits composing 
the products of 9 and their deeper mathematical determination.
It is important to emphasise that Philo is not just claiming that causal 
necessity is a form of mathematical, or geometrical, necessity. Th at is not an 
option for Hume given his view that mathematical necessities are ultimately 
tautologies, and cannot therefore determine the relation between separate 
events, the order of which can always be imagined to be otherwise. Philo’s 
point is more subtle. He is off ering us an analogy between two relations: 
these are (i) the relation between certain superfi cial characteristics of arith-
metic and the deep nature of their mathematical demonstration on the one 
hand, and (ii) the relation between superfi cial regularities of natural phe-
nomena that we observe and a demonstrative physics of nature which would 
explain those regularities. Th is analogy allows Hume to bypass the problem 
of summoning up the bare idea of necessary connexion in nature. It is suf-
fi cient that we have an understanding of the role it plays. Hume is not saying 
causal necessity is mathematical necessity. He is saying that the two forms 
of necessity have analogous roles in producing the superfi cial regularities of 
their diff erent spheres: numbers and natural phenomena.
Th e Dialogues can therefore be viewed as strengthening Hume’s mature, 
sceptical realist, theory of causality. We are shown how to make intelligible 
the assertion of real, but unknown, natural necessity within the strictures of 
Hume’s theory of intelligibility.
38  Ibid., p. 66.
39  HUME, Enquiries, 25.
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